It's not known for certain that Margaret Cavendish had Hooke's Micrographia in mind when she penned her "Observations upon Experimental Philosophy," but it seems entirely possible. Assuming she's writing about the Hooke excerpt included in your reading for today, try to pinpoint the source of her skepticism. Why does Cavendish think Hooke has got it wrong? Just how legitimate are her objections?
Deadline: Wednesday (9/9), start of class.
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
Posts
7 comments:
Robert Hooke portrays the microscope and the many misshapen observations that follow from it as being one of the greatest scientific breakthroughs of his time. However, Cavendish respectfully disagrees. She believes that the study of objects through microscopes is an enormous waste of time and potential. Cavendish's objections do provide legitimate reasoning as to why that is. For example, she claims that experimental philosophers should "find out more beneficial arts than our forefathers have done, either for the better increase of vegetables or...for the decrease of nice distinctions and sophistical disputes" (2204). Observing the world through the imperfect lens of a microscope is useless unless there is some sort of purpose or objective being fulfilled. Robert Hooke and the members of the Royal Society are like a group of five year old children putting whatever they can underneath the microscope because it looks cool. Furthermore, the data is only as good as the instrument, and the microscopes of the eighteenth century were severely flawed and inaccurate. Magnifying glasses should not be an extension of the human eye because they distort nature's true beauty.
Cavendish's skepticism is the result of a fundamental difference in opinion about the nature or purpose of science. Cavendish suggests that the "truth of an object will hardly be known" because of the inherent flaws of physical observation (2203). She believes that physical observation will never lead to an understanding of "the interior natural motions of any part or creature of nature", by which I presume she means that there exists some innate metaphysical truth or purpose in any and all objects and science (or as she might characterize it, codified sense perception) can never ascertain that truth (2203). It's possible that by "natural motions" she means something like atomic structure, in which case, she's just wildly wrong. In the former case, Hooke's mode of observational science is purely phenomenological, and isn't concerned with Cavendish's rehashing of Aristotelian ideas about any innate "truth" in objects. The two views, I think, aren't really reconcilable. As for the instrumental use of science in general and microscopes in particular, it seems that history would justify a scientific fascination with microscopes, considering the vast improvements in disease treatment as a result of microscopic investigation.
Cavendish is right to be wary of poor technology and the deceptive observations that can result from faulty instruments. Her absolute rejection of "experimental philosophy" as a "[waste of] time", however, ultimately proves to be rash and ill-founded (2204). As a final caveat, there is nothing to suggest that one's eyes identify "truth" more readily than a microscope. As Descartes points out, the eyes and other sensory perceptions can be misleading, especially at very small levels.
It almost seems that Cavendish has a very spiritual perspective implied in her skepticism of science and the microscope. She implies in "this same art, with all its instruments, is not able to discover the interior natural motions of any part of creature of nature," that she questions the legitimacy of the microscope and its ability to truly see. She indicates that there are some things that science will never be able to figure out, like the human mind.
I can see three main points of skepticism in Cavendish's philosophy. Let us first establish the fact that Cavendish views the science of "Micrography" as an art that only studies an object for what it is superficially at the microscopic level and does not address how its internal mechanics function or appear. "...micrography...is not able to discover the interior natural motions of any part or creature of nature"(2203). Secondly Cavendish believes that the naturally magnified state of living creatures, humans and animals alike, is something of artistic creation and should the microscope present itself to defeat that image then it wold ruin the beauty of nature. In other words it would "intoxicate so many men's brains" (2204). Cavendish is not thinking how progressive this new technology is whether or not it is being applied at maximum efficiency to the betterment of social, economical, and political systems. Lastly there is a flaw to the argument she presents in that there is no direct correlation to the usage of these microscopes and improving what she deems as "important" factors in society, "the art of architecture...trade and traffic"(2204). The legitimacy of her arguments to the modern eye seem almost ignorant in a sense that much scientific progress has been made by the usage of this microscopic study and while science- although in some instances has been considered beautiful- in general is considered to study the raw state of worldly material and the ugly unveiling of many mysteries is what actually moves science forward.
The microscope as it is now known is a very different instrument from the one Robert Hooke discusses in "Micrographia," thus, Cavendish is justified in her skepticism of the new scientific tool. She points out that the glass oftentimes causes objects to appear "deformed and misshaped" and that a faulty glass can so fully distort an object that its "truth... will hardly be known"(2203). Her concerns are definitely valid considering the lack of experimentation regarding the microscope and the general lack of knowlegde regarding the subjects being studied. In her opinion, the skill set associated with the microscope was completely useless to the common people, who would sooner want "bread to eat, and houses to dwell in, as also clothes to keep them from the inconveniences of the inconstant weather" than knowledge about the tip of a pin head or the consistency of cork board (2204. Moreover, she feels that magnifying glasses can still only see what is on the outside, which the natural eye is just as well suited to observe, and that because the microscope can not discover the "interior form and motions of a creature," that it is a redundant piece of equipment (2205). Considering the era in which she was writing, the level of scientific advancement, and the quest for reason and logic, Cavendish's argument is legitimate, because reason can deduce more harm than good from the magnifying glass.
I agree with most of the responses posted so far in the matter of Cavendish’s opinion of microscopes being an outlet of wasted talent. It seems Cavendish takes from Hooke’s observations and states that the desire to view the world through an enlarged lens curtails the importance and rationality of the naked eye. As she stated that this new invention “are, for art doth easily alter than inform (Longman 2203).” At the time of her writings, religious dogma would say that humans were only meant to see the world as God created it and not through the Hooke’s altered depictions. The Royal Society and Hooke’s experiments would be a complete waste since it did not “build houses, feed the family, advance trade & traffic, and architecture (Longman 2204).” The example being that the enlarged picture of the louse serves to misrepresents ‘lobsters’ and confuse an already balanced natural world. She further states that “art is…at best produces mixed or hermaphroditical figures—that is, a third figure between nature and art (Longman 2205).” What Cavendish didn’t realize through her statement was that the third figure was the emerging notion of natural science.
I agree when Tom states that it is not necessarily that Cavendish is criticizing the microscope, but that she finds that The Royal Society could have done so much more with their energy and mind. They could have undoubtedly made many improvements upon society and living conditions, instead of just observed tiny creatures but, "before the vulgar would learn to understand them, the world would want..bread to eat..keep them from the inconveniences" (Longman 2204). Cavendish is clearly commenting on their lack to attempt to improve society, along with her lack of understanding in which how much the microscope would actually help in the long run. But, at this particular moment in time, Cavendish's objections to Hooke's research, and the research of The Royal Society in general, is justified.
Post a Comment